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In one of the first papers ever published in (what was to become) the field of
environmental philosophy, nearly half a century ago, Richard Routley1 (working
in close partnership with Val Routley) claimed that there was a need for a new,
an environmental, ethic to properly underpin “people’s relationship to the natu-
ral environment”.2 Richard and Val went on to develop an environmental ethic
that they claimed differed from the traditional Western “super ethic” in recognis-
ing that items other than humans were intrinsically valuable. And that, therefore,
we must move beyond the inherent “human chauvinism” of the traditional posi-
tion in our determinations of what is good and permissible, to a view that treats
some nonhumans as more than mere means to human ends.3 Over the ensuing
decades Richard continued to defend and articulate his position, which he termed
“deep green theory” – distinguishing it from “deep ecology” with which it was
sometimes conflated. He saw his axiological theory as crucial not only to an ade-
quate account of value and environmental justice, but also to the development of
a human culture capable of sustaining itself into the future. As time went on he
saw the lack of interest in a new ethic in increasingly dismal terms, concerned in
his final years that “philosophers fiddle while the Earth begin to burn”.4 Given
all this, then, he may have taken some satisfaction in seeing the apparent growth
of this new ethical awareness in conservation planning, with increasing calls by
1Richard later changed his name to ‘Sylvan’, Val later changed hers to ‘Plumwood’.
2See Routley (1973). The other paper that made up the first published research in the field,
appearing at almost exactly the same time, was Naess (1973). Arne Naess and Richard were to
continue working at close quarters until Richard’s death in 1996. Naess was advocating a radical
new ethic similar in some ways to Richard and Val, though they were later to distance themselves
from his “deep ecology”.
3See Routley and Routley (1979).
4Sylvan (1996), Prologue.
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conservation biologists like Soulé (1985), Noss and Cooperrider (1994), and Mc-
Cauley (2006) for the recognition of the intrinsic value of elements of the natural
environment.
However, recent arguments have emerged that push back against these calls,
claiming that there is, in fact, no need for this development of value theory in
conservation planning – the orthodoxy that Richard was desperate to overthrow is
said to be correct. Maguire and Justus (2008) and Justus et al. (2009) argue that
the appeal to intrinsic value lacks sufficient clarity and fails to serve the needs of
decision-making in conservation biology. These criticisms target problems in the
use of the concept of intrinsic value by conservation biologists and serve to high-
light confusion and difficulties in the development of a coherent and efficacious
theory of intrinsic value for application in conservation decision-making. How-
ever, I shall argue contra these critics that they do not count as sufficient grounds
for the rejection of such a theory, but rather serve to show how such a theory
should properly be understood. The debate here is thus instructive in clearing
away some of the misguided claims frequently encountered in this area. Richard’s
theoretical account of the nature of and need for intrinsic value in the natural world
is required more than ever in conservation biology, and we are well-served by re-
turning to his original accounts to correct errors that have crept into recent debate
in the area.
Conservation based on intrinsic value?
Many conservationists have argued for the improved protection of natural entities
through appeal to intrinsic value. What then is intrinsic value and why appeal to
it?
Following Routley and Routley (1980) – themselves following Moore’s (1903)
original use of the notion5 – the intrinsic value of something is the value that it has
“non-instrumentally”6, value that resides in the fact that it should be valued “for it-
self”7 – value that is “not reducible (in any way) to human interests”8 or perceived
human advantage – as opposed to value that it might have as a “means to our end”
(as Moore put it). So those who advocate the intrinsic value of nonhuman biota as
an improved basis for conservation are to be understood as advocating conserva-
5Cf. Moore (1903), sections 15, 18 and 50. (Thanks to Roger Lamb for these references.)
6p. 126.
7p. 131.
8p. 129.
Australasian Journal of Logic (15:2) 2018 Article no. 4.1
500
tion that pays due attention to their value, value considered as independent from
(i.e. not reducible in any way to) human ends or interests.9 Why might intrinsic
value theorists make such a recommendation? Well, broadly put, they are con-
cerned that conservation that only pays attention to the value nonhuman biota have
for humans (as opposed to value they may have for their own sake, “inherently”)
– i.e. conservation that only pays attention to the instrumental value of nonhuman
biota, its value as a means to human advantage – will result in decision-making
where human interests are paramount since the value of any nonhuman entity will
ultimately come down to the value that thing has for us; all nonhuman value will
be a matter of the value a thing has for our sake. And this domination of human
interests is little better than the domination of self-interest; it neglects the value
that other things might have independently of our interests. Human-centeredness
(what Routley and Routley (1980) termed “human chauvinism”) is little better
than self-centeredness, and is to be overcome by acknowledging that, whether or
not humans are the ultimate source of value, they are not the ultimate or only locus
of value.10 Nonhuman biota may have value or be valued for their own sake, as
ends in themselves, regardless of whether or not they have value for us, that is,
regardless of whether we instrumentally value them. Such value is described as
intrinsic value.
The first thing to note here is that those advocating intrinsic value in the non-
human world, those advocating what Routley (1973) calls an environmental ethic,
are not advocating a new, further kind of value. As Aristotle pointed out, any
appeal to value must ultimately appeal to intrinsic value at some point, on pain of
infinite regress. Any explanation of the instrumental value of a thing must even-
tually be grounded in intrinsic value somewhere. If something is instrumentally
valuable, so valuable for something else, as a means to something else’s ends,
then its value must derive from the value of that other thing. If the value of that
other thing, in turn, derives its value from the value of something else then that
third thing must itself be valuable. And so on. Unless the derivative value of
things, the value they have for other things, can be grounded somewhere in the
non-derivative value something has, value it has for its own sake, then vicious
9Curiously, Justus et al. (2009) complain that saying “an intrinsically valuable entity is valu-
able in itself or as an end in itself” is an “unhelpful allusion” (p. 187). On the contrary, as the
standard definition it is not an allusion and is helpful in drawing the contrast with instrumental
value.
10Routley and Routley (1979), section II, argues, at length, that the inference from values having
their source in us as valuers to the conclusion that values are determined by human interests is an
invalid one.
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regress ensues and value is not grounded anywhere. Moreover, even if one is not
persuaded that intrinsic value is required for instrumental value to make sense, it
nonetheless seems obvious that people commit to the actual existence of intrinsic
value – e.g. truth, pleasure, or some such. Approaching things from the opposite
end of the spectrum, take the negative value of pain, for example. It seems obvi-
ous to many that it does not derive its disvalue by way of some further disvalue; it
just is bad in itself. There is nothing new in the kind of value (positive or negative)
being discussed.
Dominant ethical theories like traditional utilitarianism accommodate such
value by attributing intrinsic value to humans by way of human states (or, more
recently and more broadly, following Singer (1975), perhaps sentient creatures –
any creature capable of pleasure and pain). As a non-derivative value, this intrinsic
value of humans can then explain the instrumental value of other things. Cows are
(instrumentally) valuable because they provide us with meat and other products
of value to us. The cows being valuable to us confers derivative value on them
since they serve the interests of that which is nonderivately, intrinsically valuable,
namely humans. Put differently, they serve a valuable end, us. This traditional
human-centred account of value locates ultimate, intrinsic value in us. The hu-
man species is special in a way that the nonhuman is not; humans are intrinsically
valuable and the nonhuman biota has merely instrumental value.
If accounts of value, then, already accept intrinsic value somewhere, what is at
issue in the appeal to the intrinsic value of the nonhuman in conservation biology
cannot be the existence of intrinsic value, but its extent. What is distinctive of
an environmental ethic is that it simply seeks to extend intrinsic value to nonhu-
mans, an extension argued for by way of, for example, the “last man example”
(see Routley (1973) – though Routley did not, at the time, explicitly mention
“intrinsic values”; this explanatory concept was first mentioned in Val’s critical
notice of Passmore’s Man’s Responsibility For Nature, Routley (1975), and later
explicitly taken up as the distinctive feature of the “new ethic”). This extension
fits a familiar pattern. History, arguably, contains many such extensions. The
presumed intrinsic value of white Europeans over other people was all too often
presupposed in attempts to legitimise slavery. Slaves were not intrinsically valu-
able (they weren’t human, where ‘human’ denoted intrinsically valuable members
of the species homo sapiens). The value of a slave was the value that could be
derived from his or her usefulness to the (intrinsically valuable) dominant class.
Such racial chauvinism, restricting intrinsic value to a preferred dominant class,
is now generally rejected as unacceptable. So too gender chauvinism, according
to which the derivative value of a woman was their value to men. Social justice
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debates are, in effect, riddled with criticism of unjustifiable restrictions on the
extension of the set of bearers of intrinsic value. Social justice (for humans) de-
mands the extension of intrinsic value to (potentially) all humans. Advocates of
an environmental ethic go further, recommending its extension beyond the human
to species, ecosystems and other nonhuman entities.
What is wrong with the extension of intrinsic value?
With this in mind, we might then ask whether the proposed extension of the lo-
cus of intrinsic value is coherent, and whether it is necessary for conservation.
Maguire and Justus (2008) answer in the negative, targeting intrinsic value as a
poor basis for conservation decision-making on two counts: “(1) intrinsic value is
a vaguely formulated concept and not amenable to the sort of comparative expres-
sion as needed for conservation decision-making; and (2) instrumental value is a
much richer concept than generally appreciated, permitting a full range of values
of biota to be considered in conservation decisions”.11 Let us turn, initially, to (1).
The first point worth making is that it cannot especially count against an envi-
ronmental ethic (extending intrinsic value to nature) that the concept of intrinsic
value itself is vague. Since it is invoked in any theory of value, any unclarity will
infect value theory per se, and an environmental ethic is not particularly vulnera-
ble in this respect. And it is hard to see why the extension of intrinsic value beyond
the human should, as Maguire and Justus suggest, engender special problems for
its use in decision-making. After all, we make value-decisions in the purely hu-
man realm (decisions based on considerations including the intrinsic value of the
persons in question). For example, we make decisions between the delivery of
healthcare to one person or another competing for this benefit and so are forced
into making judgements involving things of intrinsic value – persons. Of course,
they can be very difficult decisions to make, and we might sometimes appeal to
a person’s additional instrumental value as well, but we ought not conclude from
this that the intrinsic value of the persons involved ought somehow be ignored or
(worse) that they cannot usefully be thought of as having intrinsic value. It would
be a gross misrepresentation of human value and human dignity to restrict our
deliberations to the value that the respective persons have for others, as a means
to their ends – a restriction to their derivative, non-intrinsic, merely instrumental
value. Of course, as pointed out in Justus et al. (2009), questions remain as to
precisely how intrinsic value might be distributed across the nonhuman world but
11Maguire and Justus (2008), p. 910.
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these simply mirror the questions as to how such value is distributed across hu-
mans. Both individuals and groups, human and nonhuman, might have intrinsic
value and saying why matters. But such accounts exist. (See, for example, Rout-
ley and Routley (1980), Elliot (1997).) Value assignments are contestable, but
these issues are not particular to intrinsic value assignments in the natural, that is,
nonhuman world.
Of course, problems may well attend particular ways of extending intrinsic
value that preclude comparison of value. One notable extension, made by some in
the field of conservation biology, and rightly of concern, is the claim that intrinsic
value in nature is “priceless” or “infinite” – e.g. McCauley (2006). Both Maguire
and Justus (2008) and Justus et al. (2009) are critical on these grounds.12 And they
are right to be. As they point out, such an account of intrinsic value would entail
the superior value of any intrinsically valuable item to all and any other items of
merely finite value, and would preclude any nontrivial comparison of the relative
values of different items of intrinsic value. All are infinitely valuable and so no
outcome that ranks the protection of one intrinsically valuable item (a rare tem-
perate rainforest, say) over that of another (a wombat, say) could be justified. Yet
just such choices face conservationists and some nontrivial decision-procedure
seems required. However, independently of any considerations arising from an
environmental ethic, we can already see that claims that intrinsic value is price-
less or infinite are misguided (and so should not be imported into debates that
seek to extend intrinsic value to the nonhuman). To be sure, there are those that
value (paradigmatically intrinsically valuable) humans as priceless. For example,
it is sometimes said that “you cannot put a price on human life”. But, of course,
we can and do in the sense that we make value judgements that discriminate be-
tween (intrinsically valuable) humans. Since infinite value cannot underpin such
a judgement, we learn that intrinsic value is not always (if ever) infinite. Surely
there are situations where the saving of one hundred human lives is to be preferred
over the saving of just one. If humans had infinite intrinsic value then the value
of the hundred is no more nor less than that of the one, such is the mathematics of
infinity.
One might object that, in fact, what is going on in the foregoing comparisons is
that intrinsic value is being ignored altogether and such comparative judgements
are being made on the basis of purely instrumental values, and, thus, so much the
worse for the efficacy of intrinsic value in debates over value comparisons, and
conservation decision-making in particular. Both Maguire and Justus (2008) and
12See Maguire and Justus (2008), p. 911; Justus et al. (2009), p. 189.
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Justus et al. (2009) appear to be making just such claims. But the fact that we
might calculate what a human life is “worth” (as Maguire and Justus put it, p.
910), and even express this in quantitative terms, does not preclude some cost-
ing of that thing’s (or person’s) intrinsic value in the calculation. Knowing what
weight to give it is, of course, difficult (a problem I return to below), but we would
hope and expect that more than their mere instrumental value to others was con-
sidered (e.g. through some appeal to their dignity or preference for a “good life”);
i.e. we aim to include, however poorly, their intrinsic value. That this may need
to be expressed in quantitative terms in a particular decision-theoretic framework
does not preclude its inclusion. (Frequently, of course, it is sufficient to achieve a
comparative ranking rather than a quantitative rating.)
And here we see the force of those advocating the recognition of the intrinsic
value of nonhuman biota. What such an environmental ethics permits is the inclu-
sion into value judgements of a thing’s intrinsic value. Just as a person may have
considerable instrumental value (being a good breadwinner for the family, etc.)
but be valued as more than a mere means to others’ ends, so too with the nonhu-
man. When judging whether or not to permit development in cassowary habitat,
an environmental ethic claims that we should consider more than the cassowary’s
tourism value, or value in the maintenance of eco-system services (through forest
regeneration, etc.), or other instrumental values – values that the cassowary has
for us, values that advantage us. We ought also give some evaluative weight to
the cassowary itself, for its own sake. Just as human actions are morally con-
strained by their effects on other humans, so too ought human actions be morally
constrained by their effects on other nonhumans, and this is what the extension of
the locus of intrinsic value aims to achieve.
This extension does not require the indiscriminate valuing of all things as equal
(let alone, infinite) any more than the recognition of the intrinsic value of humans
requires that we treat all humans as equally valuable. We can discriminate. Value,
in particular intrinsic value, is not evenly spread across the class of humans, let
alone across the broader class that includes nonhumans. Richard is very clear on
this: “having irreducible value ... does not imply having equal irreducible value,
anymore than having weight implies having equal weight.”13 Historically, some
proposing a new ethic have, indeed, committed to the idea, among them some
deep ecologists, and it is, perhaps, this influence at play in current debates. But
Richard offers an alternative development of the new ethic that avoids this (and
other problems that beset deep ecology) and is clear in his condemnation.
13Sylvan (1985), p. 7.
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According to Naess, a biospheric egalitarian principle, of equal [in-
trinsic] value of all life, is “an intuitively clear and obvious value
axiom”, at least “to the ecological field-worker” (1973, p. 96). But
empirical surveys would almost certainly not sustain Naess’s claims.
The principle seems generally neither intuitive nor obvious ... On
the contrary, value seems, like yellowness, to be much more patchily
distributed across the universe. Special places, for instance, are es-
pecially valuable ... even if every living thing were assigned value, it
would not follow (in the way sometimes invalidly argued) that every
thing has it equally.14
What we can already say then, irrespective of whether or not nonhuman items can
have intrinsic value, is that accounts of intrinsic value as necessarily infinite, or
otherwise everywhere equal, are mistaken. The biospheric egalitarianism of deep
ecology imported into debates about intrinsic value in conservation biology ought
be rejected. Even on a traditional human-centred account of intrinsic value, we
already require an account of such value that permits non-trivial comparison. So,
regardless of claims like those of McCauley (2006) – who have put forward a par-
ticular version of intrinsic value theory, apparently drawing on deep ecology, that
is fraught with problems – there is no reason why intrinsic value should be seen
as acknowledging the equal value of all species and ecosystems, or (even worse)
valuing them as “priceless” or “infinite”. To be sure, any intrinsic value theory
that commits itself to these extraneous features is subject to damaging criticism,
but this observation does not undermine the appeal to intrinsic value per se, it
simply serves to show how not to understand the concept, and was not how the
concept was understood by Richard.15
Is intrinsic value ‘valuer-independent’?
There is a further, related charge associated with criticism (1) mentioned at the
beginning of the previous section: that committing to the intrinsic value of natu-
14ibid.
15Not only did Richard reject the egalitarian principle of the equal intrinsic value of all life,
he thought that value was unevenly distributed in such a way that sometimes the value of the
nonhuman could trump the value of humans – i.e. he also rejected what he termed “the greater
value assumption” according to which “even though other things may have intrinsic value, people
or humans are more valuable than anything else, and rank more highly”, Routley and Routley
(1980), p. 171.
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ral entities cannot guide the decision-making that conservation requires because
it precludes conservation decisions being analysed with the same tools as other
decisions with multiple, sometimes conflicting, goals; and this because we have
no clear means to measure and weigh a thing’s intrinsic value.
One might well wonder why comparisons of intrinsic value are taken to be
so intractable. The answer seems to reside in the conception of “intrinsic value”
under discussion. Justus et al. complain that “unlike instrumental value, char-
acterizations of intrinsic value in the conservation literature suggest it is valuer
independent and thus independent of stakeholder valuation. It therefore seems to
have no role in these decision frameworks.”16 Thus, it appears that what underpins
their concern is the suggestion that intrinsic value is valuer-independent. And the
claim of valuer-independence is, indeed, one that has been applied to accounts of
intrinsic value. Since its early explicit advocacy in environmental ethics in the
1970s, the idea that intrinsic value is problematic since valuer-independent, and
thus difficult to calculate, has surfaced again and again.17
What lies at the heart of such criticisms is the idea that intrinsic value is ob-
jective value, value that inheres in an object independently of any valuers, i.e.
independently of whether the object is valued by valuers or not. As Sagoff (2009)
suggests, Justus et al. react against just such a view of intrinsic value. They con-
trast intrinsic value with instrumental value, where entities “with instrumentally
valuable properties are valuable to the extent they are or will be considered valu-
able by valuers”.18 For example, “Art is instrumentally, not intrinsically, valuable
because its value is dependent on and derives from the responses it produces in
humans”.19 Intrinsic value then is understood as precisely that kind of value that
is not dependent on nor derives from the responses it produces in humans; enti-
ties with intrinsically valuable properties are valuable regardless of whether or not
they are considered valuable by valuers.
Intrinsic value is thus valuer-independent and objective, on this view, in just
the same way that it is commonly thought that the mass of an object is an objective
property of the object in question. Now a problem emerges. Unlike an object’s
mass, which we can judge by way of our normal senses, an object’s intrinsic value
16Justus et al. (2009), pp. 188-9.
17See, for example, an early response to the Routleys: Mannison (1980), p. 57. Richard and
Val went to great pains to refute charges of objectivism commonly associated with intrinsic values
– intrinsic values needn’t be objective values, they argued (cf. Routley and Routley (1980), p.
154ff).
18Justus et al. (2009), pp. 187.
19Justus et al. (2009), pp. 188.
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cannot in any obvious way be judged without positing some analogous sense ca-
pable of discerning value, some intuitive moral faculty. In this respect, an objec-
tivist account of intrinsic value seems to suffer from an epistemological problem
(how can we know the value weighting of such an object?) broadly similar to that
faced by an objectivist account of abstract objects like numbers and sets. If such
objects have objective existence, independently of us, then how can we explain
our knowledge of truths involving them without recourse to some special mathe-
matical intuition? This is the classic problem of epistemic access that is levelled
at Platonist accounts of mathematics. So, too, with the value posited by intrin-
sic value theory. Moral intuitionism threatens. This supposed independence of
intrinsic value from valuers results in its epistemological intractability.
But such an objection to the extension of intrinsic value to nonhuman biota is
contentious. Firstly (repeating a point made earlier), whether or not intrinsic value
is objective in this sense, we already have good evidence that it can be included
in decision-making since we already reconcile (however badly) opposing intrinsic
values in decision-making about humans (agreed by most, if not all, parties to the
conservation debate to involve deliberation over competing intrinsic values). It is
certainly true that weighing intrinsic value is difficult, but, as the Routleys point
out,
the difficulties of transferring or adapting rather standard methods of
assessment, such as decision theory and cost-benefit analyses, to pro-
vide rational decision methods in the case of environmental matters
has been much exaggerated ... [A]n environmental ethic should not,
any more than other ethics or economics, be expected to provide a
decision procedure for any and every case that may arise: the theory
(and accompanying intuitions) may have to be developed to resolve
some cases, while other cases may go (cheerfully) undecided. On
similar test or decision cases, e.g. one group of starving people ver-
sus another group in a situation of limited resources, or quality of life
versus number of humans, conventional ethical theories may offer no
quick, or clearcut, resolutions, etc.20
But these difficulties are not adequate grounds for the outright exclusion of intrin-
sic value from our deliberations.
Secondly, and more importantly, equating intrinsic value with objective value
risks repeating an all-too common error. They are not synonymous. Values can be
20Routley and Routley (1980), p. 173.
Australasian Journal of Logic (15:2) 2018 Article no. 4.1
508
intrinsic yet nonetheless non-objective. To put the point another way, it does not
follow from the dependence of a value on human valuers (non-objectivity) that
the value must be instrumental (non-intrinsic), and for many ethical theorists it is
not thought to follow. (See, for example, a subjectivist account of intrinsic value
in Elliot (1997). For a good summary of the issues here see Sandler (2012).) A
problem arises from equivocation on the exact sense of ‘independence’ at issue.
Values might be said to be independent of valuers insofar as things may be said
to have value independently of their being valued by us, or they may be said to be
independent of valuers insofar as things may be said to have value independently
of their value for us. Non-objectivists about value (e.g. subjectivists) will agree
that to have value requires valuers – for value to come into the world valuers are
required in some way or other and value is, thus, not detached from valuers –
yet it does not follow from this that our valuations are human centred and that,
accordingly, when we value things we must be judging their value for us. Even if
values are, indeed, anthropogenic it does not follow that they are anthropocentric.
Value might depend on (and, for the subjectivist, ultimately derive from) us in
some way but valuations need not be ultimately concerned merely with what is
valuable for us.
Of course, worries attend those non-objectivist accounts of value that are sub-
jectivist, anthropogenic accounts. If values have their source in us then the value
of a thing depends, problematically, on our valuing them. For this reason the ob-
jective nature of intrinsic value is appealing, securing the value of things against
the vagaries of human valuers. The strong foundations sought by conservationists
for the value of natural items might be taken to require an objectivist story to se-
cure the necessary robustness of value, thus explaining the claimed prevalence of
objectivist accounts of intrinsic value in the conservation literature, and therewith
follow the attendant epistemic problems for their inclusion in decision theoretic
frameworks. However, a conservationist’s robust defence of nature through a ro-
bust account of the intrinsic value of (at least) some nonhuman entities need not
commit them to an objectivist theory of value. Values may still depend on valuers
without losing their robustness.
In this respect, values might be rather like colour or smell. Standard accounts
of colour acknowledge that particular objects may be coloured at a time though
at that time there is no one seeing them and, importantly, they have this robust-
ness without denying that there is some kind of dependency of colour on suit-
able observers. To be red is for an object to be such that it would appear red to
normal observers under normal conditions. On this response-dependent account,
so-called secondary qualities like colour or smell can be said to be robust dis-
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positional properties of the things in question, determined by the responses of
potential select observers to the things in themselves. So too, one might think,
with values. Things may be valuable in the absence of anyone actually valuing
them, while nonetheless depending on potential (select) valuers, potential valuers
suitably informed (say). Natural entities might thus be valuable, whether or not
there is anybody to do the actual valuing.
For the record, while likening intrinsic value to response-dependent proper-
ties like colour might help in illuminating the existence of at least one path be-
tween purely subjectivist accounts and objectivist ones, allowing for a robustness
while admitting an essential connection to valuers (“no values without possible
valuers”), this was not, ultimately, Richard’s route. “Goodness, and value more
generally ... are not secondary or tertiary or response dependent properties, and a
comparison with shape is superior to one with colour”21 – though he had earlier
found the comparison useful. Nonetheless, he maintained his view that:
Values, of one sort or another, are features objects may have or lack;
they are not subjective, they are not features which reduce to states
or conditions of subjects or valuers. But no more are they objec-
tive features, natural or empirical features of objects, features entirely
detached from valuers. A largely unquestioned false dichotomy be-
tween subjective and objective ethical theories has served to rule out
important options.22
In the end then, there seems no reason why we cannot measure and weigh a thing’s
intrinsic value in just the same way we measure and weigh other values. There is
nothing intrinsic to intrinsic values that puts them beyond measure; certainly, in
measuring we do not thereby establish them as instrumental.
Of course, measuring and weighing value, whether instrumental or intrinsic is
a fraught social enterprise and a neat consensus is rarely, if ever, achieved. But the
introduction of intrinsically valuable nonhuman items does not, in itself, constitute
an impassable barrier.
Are intrinsic values needed?
With a suitably robust non-objective account of value that is nonetheless not an-
thropocentric, extending intrinsic value to the nonhuman, it is instructive to fi-
21Sylvan and Bennett (1994), p. 143. (Thanks, again, to Roger Lamb for the reference.)
22Routley and Routley (1980), p. 154.
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nally turn to criticism (2) identified earlier as grounds for rejecting intrinsic value
in conservation decision-making: namely, that intrinsic value is not needed once
the full richness of the concept of instrumental value is appreciated, a concept
which (Justus et al. claim) admits the full range of value considerations needed
for conservation decisions.
Here we see potential equivocation of the kind identified a few paragraphs
earlier. If intrinsic value is to be rejected as problematic or intractable then, it
is urged, we must appeal solely to instrumental value, considered as value that
is “dependent” on valuers. And Justus et al. claim that such values alone can
serve our needs.23 Examples of such efficacious instrumental values are said to
include: aesthetic value; ecological value; the value of ecosystem services; med-
ical, recreational and tourist value; educational value; “existence value” (i.e. the
value of a thing’s mere existence); and spiritual value. From the perspective of
a non-objectivist account of value, e.g. Richard’s, any value depends on valuers
in some sense. So the issue as to whether these supposedly “instrumental values”
are sufficient for conservation decision-making is whether or not such values are
sufficient when clearly identified as merely instrumental in the proper sense, i.e.
when they are understood as values that things may have, not as ends in them-
selves, but as a means to some further end. The ultimate ends typically assumed,
of course, are our self-interested ends, our perceived advantage (it is, after all, the
human chauvinist that Richard’s intrinsic value theory is targeting). In this case,
the values are instrumental in the proper sense only if they are identified as the
value they have for us (not simply the value they have that depends on us).
To be clear then, the aforementioned values are instrumental only if under-
stood as follows. Ecological value is not merely what is taken to be ecologically
valuable by us, but what is ecologically valuable for us; existence value is not
merely what is taken to be the value of a thing’s existence by us, but the value of
a thing’s existence for us; and so on. Thus understood, it is far from clear that
instrumental value (properly understood) is sufficient. A species’ existence (for
example) might conceivably have no value for us – it might conceivably not ad-
vantage us in any way – though we might value its existing. Its existence may
be of no instrumental value to us yet we value it nonetheless. (Of course, if we
derive satisfaction from the maintenance of this existence value through species
conservation then the thing in question might also have instrumental value, but
this consequent value should not be confused with the basis for its conservation,
its intrinsic value.) Only by equivocating between its having existence value for us
23See p. 188.
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and its existence being valued by us can it be claimed that this latter value can be
accounted for within a purely “instrumental” moral framework. And it is this lat-
ter value, it seems, that defenders of a purely instrumental account are suggesting
can (contra claims by intrinsic value theorists) be accommodated.
Thus we see that: (i) the problems that are said to beset intrinsic value in
conservation decision-making are overstated; and (ii) the supposed ability of in-
strumental value to account for the full range of value considerations needed in
conservation decision-making is overestimated. Intrinsic value, properly under-
stood, is both available and needed. There is every reason then to agree with key
proponents of the inclusion of the intrinsic value of nonhuman biota in conserva-
tion decision-making.
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